You are now leaving the DARPA.mil website that is under the control and management of DARPA. The appearance of hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by DARPA of non-U.S. Government sites or the information, products, or services contained therein. Although DARPA may or may not use these sites as additional distribution channels for Department of Defense information, it does not exercise editorial control over all of the information that you may find at these locations. Such links are provided consistent with the stated purpose of this website.
After reading this message, click to continue immediately.
The goal of the Leveraging the Analog Domain for Security (LADS) program is to develop new cybersecurity capabilities by exploring the intersection of the analog and digital domains. The high-level vision is that the combination of analog signal analysis (e.g., as used in side-channel attacks) and program analysis techniques will enable high-fidelity, high-accuracy introspection of embedded and mission-specific devices (EMSDs) by an external monitoring device, and that such introspection will enable the detection of a variety of adversaries. Although the primary focus is on EMSDs, the program is also interested in the application of such techniques in traditional information technology (IT) devices.
Program Manager: Dr. Angelos Keromytis
The content below has been generated by organizations that are partially funded by DARPA; the views and conclusions contained therein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
Report a problem: firstname.lastname@example.org
Last updated: Jun 16, 2017
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||Zero-Overhead Profiling via EM Emanations||http://alenka.ece.gatech.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2016/09/ZoP.pdf|
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||Spectral Profiling: Observer-Effect-Free Profiling by Monitoring EM Emanation||http://alenka.ece.gatech.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2016/08/MICRO16.pdf|
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||A method for finding frequency-modulated and amplitude-modulated electromagnetic emanations in computer systems||http://alenka.ece.gatech.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2016/11/TEMC-074-2016.pdf|
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||Path Loss Prediction for Electromagnetic Side-Channel Signals||http://alenka.ece.gatech.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2017/02/EUCap17.pdf|
|Riverside Research||Characterization of a Riscure 1-GHz Low Sensitivity Probe for Side Channel Analysis||http://spie.org/Publications/Proceedings/Paper/10.1117/12.2262121|
|Riverside Research||Extraction and Validation of Algorithms from Analog Side-Channels||http://spie.org/Publications/Proceedings/Paper/10.1117/12.2262113|
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||EDDIE: EM-Based Detection of Deviations in Program Execution||http://alenka.ece.gatech.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2017/06/ISCA17.pdf|
|Georgia Institute of Technology, Northrop Grumman||Leveraging Electromagnetic Emanations for IoT Security||http://pwp.gatech.edu/ece-alenka/wp-content/uploads/sites/463/2017/06/Leveraging-Electromagnetic-Emanations-for-IoT-Security.pdf|